Photo credit: MLSsoccer.com
Imagine, for a moment, it’s December 12th, 2021, and Matías Almeyda’s men just woke up as improbable MLS champions. It’s certainly not the most likely outcome for a season where they are dead last in the eyes of the bookmakers to achieve that feat at 100-to-1. However, it’s not completely insane either, given Almeyda’s track record of riding a hot hand at the right time to major trophies, the title’s elimination format, and the relative parity of MLS. It certainly would not be as grandiose of an upset as Leicester winning the Premier League.
But what would have to be true for such a thing to happen? Or perhaps a slightly more modestly successful season, with a US Open Cup title or a playoff round win for the first time for more than a decade? I thought that it would be a useful thought exercise for examining what would have to go right to make the optimistic case true, within the boundaries of reality.
As such, here were the four key storylines in San Jose’s (hypothetical) title-winning season:
Almeyda-the-Scout finally does Almeyda-the-Coach justice
The Argentine manager was mocked for his insistence on signing players he had previously managed earlier in the year when the numbers had reached the point of absurdity. And the general discomfort with the practice was not unjustified, given that his first three signings of that type were Andy Ríos, Carlos Fierro, and Daniel Vega, who collectively made $2.1M last year and each took up international slots, yet whose production simply never lived up to that investment.
This spring, however, Almeyda’s knowledge of exactly what his former charges could offer was essential in building out the roster to suit the idiosyncratic needs of his system. Luciano Abecasis, a bit of a South American journeyman, was steady as a freight train on both the left and right, filling in any gaps in the fullback rotation as they emerged, and for a time taking the starting right back slot from Tommy Thompson due to superior defensive nous. Eric Remedi found something closer to his 2018 form again as a deep, combative metronome, playing serious minutes alongside either Jackson Yueill or Judson as the circumstance required, offering the Quakes the first viable third option in the pivot that Almeyda has ever had. That was particularly valuable during the dog days of summer, when fatigue and Yueill’s participation in the Gold Cup limited availability.
But most important, of course, was Chofis López, who had fallen well out of favor at Chivas and of whom fans were initially quite skeptical. He was short, and not particularly athletic-looking, but his quality on the ball and vision were miles ahead of almost all his teammates. He was also miles ahead of his predecessors: finally, Almeyda had a 10 who could beat defenders on his own (unlike Ríos and Eriksson), whose vision made those around him better (unlike Vako), and whose quality was similar to others at his position in MLS (unlike all of them). He wasn’t as defensively rugged as Eriksson, say, but he did enough in that category to keep Almeyda happy. Overall, he created a coherence in possession and in the final third that evened out some of the boom-or-bust we’d seen in prior Almeyda years, and he was the straw that stirred the drink for an attack that ended up in the top 3 in the league in goals scored.
Cade Cowell erupts
We all knew not to read too much into preseason performances, but it turned out that the 4-goals-in-2-games Cowell scored against the Republic and Roots were a very direct preview of what we would see from the precocious 17 year old. We knew that he was physically advanced well beyond his years, with a strong mentality, but we didn’t know that he would learn the technical and tactical elements of the game so early, and learn how to impose himself fairly consistently in a league of grown men.
And we’re not talking just a complementary contribution: Cowell bagged 10 goals and 3 assists in all competitions, looking like Mbappe or Ronaldo Nazario when being played in behind and galloping downfield from his left wing position. His contribution wasn’t merely in the goals he scored, but the fear his pace inspired in back lines created a form of gravity that opened up space for Cristian Espinoza, Wondo, and Chofis to do damage.
Over the full season, there were periods where he was less influential, and his defensive naïveté was occasionally exposed, but the spectacular supernova highlights he posted were frequent enough to add far more points than he ever gave away. It was the best season by a teenager in MLS since Alphonso Davies.
Jesse Fioranelli played his last two cards correctly
By my count, there were (are?) two senior slots, two designated player slots, and around $1.2M of cumulative Cap-space/GAM/TAM available in early April. Given that the cap charge of two Designated Players fits exactly into that amount (or several variations of a DP and a TAM player), it should have been more obvious at the time that the Swiss General Manager was going to put a square peg in a square hole.
The first move was the more obvious one, given how frequently Fioranelli discussed prioritizing the back line and set piece defense: toward the end of the primary transfer window on June 1, they used TAM to snag 28-year-old Argentine Fabian Noguera, whom they failed to sign on a free just months earlier, but with his new club happy to pocket a transfer fee. Noguera is a 6’4″ aerial specialist with enough athleticism to keep up in MLS, and most importantly: also a former player of Almeyda’s from his Banfield days. The addition of a big, reasonably pacy body to the back line relieved immense pressure all around, improving the set piece defense and making the the squad less vulnerable to getting stretched and losing footraces. He was outshone by several of the other new additions, but fixed the last remaining fundamental flaw that kept the team from aspiring any higher than a first-round playoff exit. The defense definitely didn’t become elite as a result of his arrival, but the floor was raised, with fewer apocalyptic stretches like September 2020, and they finish middle of the pack in goals allowed.
The second move was just as welcome, although it had a bit more of the feeling of something falling in the Quakes’ lap. Mario Mandžukić, the Croatian World Cup Finalist and veteran of several of Europe’s top clubs, gets released by AC Milan as of July 1, having not made many appearances for the Rossoneri this year, and Fioranelli pounced. The striker didn’t come cheap, at a reported $2M/year, he had just turned 35, and required the Quakes to buy an additional international slot. But fans were delighted at the ambition it showed.
A big-bodied, tenacious, legendarily-fit number 9, he provided something San Jose has not had since the bash brothers: a target striker to bring others into play. Almeyda fell in love with him before the signing was even completed, watching him press and harry and win second balls. But Mandžukić isn’t just a bully: he’s actually an incredibly technical player, especially by MLS standards, and he put the players around him in excellent positions as well as contributing 7 valuable goals down the stretch and 2 more in the playoffs, including the winner in the final. He probably didn’t end up living up to the astronomical wage (by San Jose standards, at least), but he was very much what was required to put them over the top from a dark horse to a serious contender, meaning the money was well spent.
The passing of time helps the youngsters more than it hurts the vets
San Jose’s squad balance, from an age perspective, is a bit odd. There are numerous players in their 30s, including several well into their 30s, and who largely are core players. On the other end of the spectrum is a fairly large grouping of young players who haven’t even really made the first team yet, as well as a few younger first-teamers with room still to grow.
What the Quakes needed, then, was an odd time-space imbalance where the younger players came along at a faster rate than the older players declined, and that’s exactly what they got. As for the vets, Chris Wondolowski proved ageless yet again, bagging 7 goals despite his playing time gradually diminishing with the emergence of other options. Shea Salinas remained a utility tool super-sub, bringing energy and savvy as he always has. Alanís had as strong of a year as any that he’s had recently, and squad players Flo Jungwirth and Andy Ríos were productive when called upon.
As for the youngsters, none of them had anything remotely close to the historic efforts of Cowell, but several took the next step and made contributions for the first time in their young careers. Siad Haji, the enigmatically talented winger, improved his defensive awareness and physical abilities enough to see meaningful minutes behind Espinoza. Jacob Akanyirige played important spot minutes in the back line prior to Noguera’s arrival, showing that he had added a bit of tactical refinement and aggression to his athleticism and preternatural calm, before getting sent out on loan to USL. Fuentes, Walls, Ochoa, Kikanovic, and Williamson would all have to wait another season before a real breakthrough.
Most important, however, was the progress of the young players who had already established a foothold in the first team. JT Marcinkowski built off of his late-2020 performances and never looked back, with solid shot-stopping combined with standout ball-playing relieving pressure on a stressed San Jose back line, leaving no doubt whatsoever that he is the best keeper at the club. Marcos López, similarly, continued his ascent that began a year ago, growing in confidence while in possession, but adding more strength and defensive ruggedness to his game, to the point he’s discussed amongst the league’s best at the position. Eric Calvillo and Tanner Beason both play rotational minutes with competence, if not star power.
Awakening from the dream
This is, of course, an imagined history. It’s akin to “scenario analysis” that the defense department and financial firms use not to predict the future, but to game out how one should approach potential outcomes.
I think it is quite likely that the 2021 season is much less successful than that for San Jose, and my case for that is essentially to invert each one of the story lines above. In that case, you’d say that “Matías the scout” failed just as many have before him in doing two very different jobs well, and instead was just relying on familiarity at the cost of excellence. You’d probably bet that young players didn’t take steps forward, whereas older players took steps back. It’s almost certain that the Front Office would have failed to address their greatest weakness (center-back), at least in a timely or adequate manner, and that they did too little to improve the team over the summer.
Soon enough, we’ll see the real answer to the question. For now, we just have to evaluate whether the optimist’s case for San Jose’s season, which is presumably what the club itself would say, is more believable than the pessimist’s case. So which one are you buying?
