There are no shortage of season previews for the MLS 2019 season that will give you all sorts of predictions about the places teams will finish come playoff time in October. Here’s a spoiler: 99% of them are wrong. They are based on last year’s results, last year’s players, last year’s coaching. Pity Martinez is already the best 10 to ever play in MLS before he has spent a minute on the pitch, taking Atlanta United under a new coach (Frank de Boer), a new system, a new formation, a new philosophy – all without Miguel Almirón – to unprecedented heights.
By July, there’s a decent chance we’ll be talking about how Atlanta United is a shell of their former self, de Boer has lost control of the team, and the Martinez boys, Pity and Josef, are looking for new teams. Why? Because this is sports, this is MLS, and this is how things happen in reality.
https://www.vox.com/videos/2017/6/5/15740632/luck-skill-sports
According to the image in the article, the luck/skill ratio of the Premier League is somewhere between Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association.
One way to check this is how often a repeat champion occurs in a particular sport or game. Since the start of the modern Premier League, there have been repeat champions seven times, and it happened four times in the first ten years. However, as more years go by, the percentage of times it has happened has steadily decreased to under 30%, and there hasn’t been a repeat Premier League champion since the 2008/2009 season – 10 years ago.
With the current salary cap and many other factors at play, MLS is said to have a higher parity than other leagues. But is this true? Last year, my American Soccer Analysis colleagues Cheuk Hei Ho, Eliot McKinley and the Dummy Run, took a look at this:
Using the statistical principles of the Gini Coefficient, MLS has a parity of just over twice that of the Premier League. This is reflected in its MLS Cup champions (three times in 23 years):
Ah, but the playoffs are a crapshoot you say? Indeed they are. But here are the Supporters Shield champions:
The Supporters Shield is a much more fitting comparison to the Premier League and still it has had a repeat champion only three times in the 23-year history of the league and has had 13 unique champions.
So basically, no one knows what will happen in a season. How did your last NCAA basketball tournament bracket do picking all the higher seeds in a sport with a high skill-to-luck ratio? Probably not so good.
Let’s look at the things which actually affect how teams do in MLS. Back in September, another American Soccer Analysis colleague of mine, Jared Young, used the Proactivity score (Pscore) to analyze MLS teams in his article: The Tactical Proactivity of each MLS Team. Long story short, the most proactive team was the New York Red Bulls (winners of the Supporters Shield) and the top five most proactive teams had an average of 1.75 points per game and were all in the playoffs.
Here is the key graphic from that article:
Notice anything? Seven of the nine teams on the High Pressure side of the graph, regardless of whether they played direct or indirect, made the playoffs last year.
In American Soccer Analysis’ MLS 2019 San Jose Earthquakes season preview, the following graphic is shared:
Based on two methods of analyzing pressure, Passes per Defensive Action and Team Expected Passing (xPass) in the 40% of the pitch closest to the opponent goal, the 2018 Earthquakes were dead last. Lowest pressure in the league. Sure, teams like the Columbus Crew and the Portland Timbers were low pressure teams and still made the playoffs, but the majority of low pressure teams did not. You can be a low pressure team, so long as you have a system and the right players to play your way out of the back and into the attacking zone – the Earthquakes did not have this.
In hiring Matías Almeyda, San Jose general manager Jesse Fioranelli has made a big statement: He wants to join the high-pressure side of the league. Almeyda is known for his man-to-man press and aggressive attacking style. Earthquakes fans got their first real look at this in action this past Saturday in a preseason game against the Seattle Sounders. Fielding a man-to-man press in soccer is akin to being the only team in the NBA who plays a man-to-man defense instead of a zone. It looks different. It’s potentially confusing, and defensive assignments, particularly secondary assignments, can be tricky.
And it didn’t always go well on Saturday.
You can see here that the Quakes centerbacks get spread out in their man coverage, Sounders goalkeeper Stefan Frei finds a spot, a Quakes defender gets a little aggressive, and then the Sounders are almost off to the races. After the game, Nick Lima provided some instant analysis of situations like this, remarking, “We (have) to talk. (We need) a lot of communication in short, little moments, and not have huge holes in the field. Sometimes we kind of got caught.”
The Earthquakes don’t have long to figure it out. With back-to-back home games to start the season over two weeks, the team has an opportunity to get off on the right foot early as compared to last season where they had one home game, and then waited two weeks for each of the next two games which were on the road.
Another key element of Almeyda’s system is aggressively attacking forward once the ball is won. Chris Wondolowski commented about this change after the game: “It creates a lot of chances going forward. It’s the complete opposite (of a possession style). We’re ultra aggressive. It allows us to press high up the field. It allows us to move up as a team and be organized.”
It’s too early to say the Earthquakes are ready to join the ranks of the high pressure elite in the league. Last season, the New England Revolution got out to a fast start thanks to their high pressure system which parodied many aspects of the New York Red Bulls’ system. However, things soon went awry for them, finishing out of the playoffs. Nothing is guaranteed just because a team decides to play high pressure.
While there are many differences between Almeyda’s man-to-man system and the Red Bulls’ and Revolution’s systems, all these systems are based on winning the ball higher up the pitch and then playing quick and direct before the opposing defenses can get set. This means shorter possessions, with more chaotic play, increasing the number of turnovers as a side effect. This shows up in the 2018 data for these teams.
As you can see, the Red Bulls and Revolution have the least amount of touch before they turn the ball over in the league. Even in a low pressure system, San Jose was still on the right side of the graph in 2018. This is because the Earthquakes lacked (and still lack) the central midfield to be able to hold onto the ball and make their way up the pitch like the elite offensive teams on the left side of the graph. In other words, Almeyda’s system might be exactly the right system for a team like the Earthquakes.
It also explains why Magnus Eriksson has started playing in a creative 10-type role for San Jose this preseason. Almeyda likely sees in Eriksson a risk-taker who attempts the home run ball – the perfect defense splitting pass – more often than not. Looking at American Soccer Analysis passing data for last season, we see this in full effect.
In 2018, Eriksson had the most vertical pass average in the attacking third of any of the attacking midfielders and forwards at 1.6. He also had the most passes attempted in the attacking third by almost 50 over Vako. Given the aggressive nature of his passes, his passing percentage is a low 61.7%, but it is actually higher than his expected passing percentage of 61.1%, indicating his quality matches the risk level of his passes. Throw in a team-high 61 key passes (passes which lead to a shot), and 1.7 more Expected Assists (xA) than the closest player, Vako, and no wonder Almeyda sees Eriksson as someone in a more central role.
After the Sounders game, Wondo spoke about Eriksson’s new role, “That’s his natural spot. He’s left-footed so everyone always want to put left-footers on the outside. But I think he’s doing great — in the middle — finding pockets and freeing up myself, and it’s been very nice.” Also by putting Eriksson central, Almeyda neutralizes his biggest weakness as an MLS winger, his pace, replacing it with speedy newcomer Christian Espinoza who will be an asset pressing on the same side as Nick Lima.
So don’t dwell on the lowly predictions for the 2019 San Jose Earthquakes. Know that things happen in cycles in this unpredictabe league and repeat champions are rare. Given what breeds success in MLS, a well-working pressing and gegenpressing scheme with a quick counter attack might be just what this Quakes team needs to get back to the playoffs.
Let the Almeyda era begin.
