July 13, 2024 – San Jose Earthquakes’ interim head coach, Ian Russell, paces the sidelines ahead of a game against Sporting Kansas City at PayPal Park. Photo by Sara Nicole Mindful Photography (Sara Leyva) for Quakes Epicenter.
In my most recent “Aftershock” appearance (link), I argued that successful organizations need to have strong alignment on a vision from the owner down through the GM to the coaching staff. That means John Fisher has to make a call about which vision he finds most believable as a recipe for success, fully invest in it, and make sure that he has a GM and a coach that fit that approach. Long time followers probably recognized something in this sentiment from three years ago, when I wrote about the same concept prior to Leitch’s hiring.
To be clear, there are certain things that are likely a good idea regardless of pathway, including finding a way to get Carlos Gruezo out of that DP slot at the lowest net cost possible and signing Niko Tsakiris to an extension that puts him into a U22 slot (where he can be offered a raise but keeping his cap hit low, similar to what the club did with Cade Cowell a few years ago). Oh yeah, and they probably ought to keep the spending target much closer to the middle of the league than the bottom.
But there are other major decisions that could go either way depending on your strategy: whether to opt for the 3 DPs + 3 U22s model or the 2 DPs + 4 U22s + $2M GAM model (new under MLS rules), whether to try to bring back veterans Jackson Yueill and Jeremy Ebobisse, and even whether to hang on to Amahl Pellegrino. And needless to say, the vision will also dictate who the right GM and coach is to do the job.
Here are three paths that John Fisher ought to consider:
Stay the course
The concept with this path is that you believe that the Leitch/Luchi philosophy and approach was mostly right, and that the bad results have primarily been due to bad luck, a coach who wasn’t quite up to the task, and one bad DP signing (Gruezo) whom that coach pushed for.
If that’s the case, you don’t make huge changes: you mostly retain the existing roster, except for replacing Gruezo with a better DP in the same position, and tinkering with some of the depth spots. That means you’re picking the 3 DP model, and the GM stays since you think Leitch has been making the right calls.
The big difference, then, is the coach: your goal is to find someone who will largely have the same philosophy as Luchi, but will be more effective and has more of a proven track record. That means you don’t retain Ian Russell as head coach (although perhaps he stays on as an assistant for continuity), and instead hunt for someone with either a track record of success at a high level or who is considered a very hot prospect in the coaching market.
That could mean a European manager in one of their lesser leagues who can be tempted to come over (something similar to when DC united got Hernan Losada from the Belgian league). It could also mean a hot prospect within North America, such as Mark Briggs, the 42-year-old Englishman who currently manages Sacramento Republic. It could even mean someone like Gregg Berhalter who, as much as certain USMNT fans might wince, has a very strong track record at the MLS level.
With a better coach, a few positive roster moves, and less bad luck, I can imagine this club being markedly better in 2025, potentially a playoff team. I find this vision believable. But I don’t have enough confidence in it to recommend it, since it’s asking for results to change quite a lot without making a lot of changes internally.
Find a star manager and clear the decks for them
If you think the bad results this year reflect a much more profound issue than bad luck and a few transfer misses, and you’re willing to do something bold, you should push the “hard reset” button. That means clearing out the existing roster and then handing the keys over to a star manager to imprint their identity on the club, and more or less define the vision themselves. From there, you mold everything else to their tastes, including who the GM is, making sure that the star manager actually understands the dimensions of the challenge.
That likely means you fire Leitch as GM and plan on a full front office overhaul. In terms of roster, it means that Yueill and Ebobisse are allowed to leave on frees, and you try to get rid of any older players (such as Pellegrino) who aren’t likely to be around beyond 2025. This is a 3-5 year project, and you want to give the new manager a blank canvass to work with.
This is more or less what Fisher attempted to do with the Matías Almeyda appointment, which was an impressively bold investment and gave the entire organization a clear identity. Where it failed was a huge gap in alignment between Almeyda, who was accustomed to managing clubs that out-spent their competition, and a club that was instead spending towards the bottom. The Argentine proved over and over again that he wasn’t capable of building a good roster if he didn’t have an overwhelming spending advantage. Jesse Fioranelli, who was at least aligned with Almeyda, wasn’t an effective enough partner/counterweight to correct this problem, and we were left with Andy Ríos and Carlos Fierro amongst the highest paid players in the club.
In an ideal world, this vision looks a bit like what Tottenham has done with Ange Postecoglou: they found a manager they believed in, and after they appointed him they re-formed their front office to suit his particular philosophy and approach. The club was completely transformed in terms of style and philosophy, almost overnight. The results immediately got better too, although we’re only one year into the project, so it’s hard to know whether it will be considered a success in the long run.
The problem, of course, is finding the right person. Not only do you have to be able to identify someone who is worthy of being given more or less total control of the club, but they have to find someone willing to take on the incredible career risk that comes with managing the San Jose Earthquakes, a bottom-dwelling team that hasn’t had a winning season in more than a decade.
As such, while I find this vision potentially quite attractive, it’s also risky (as we’ve seen with Almeyda), and may even be unrealistic if no Almeyda-like figure is willing to sign on. So even if you believe this is the best course of action, I would not spend more than a few months trying to find the right fit, and if one isn’t found, you’ll have to pivot to a new approach rather than risk handing the keys to the wrong person.
“Get Rich Slowly” with Ian Russell
If you like the early results you’ve seen with Ian Russell, think Leitch has mostly been making good moves, and have a bit of appetite for risk, you should stick with the existing setup and give them a mandate to pursue something like what the Philadelphia Union have done over the last decade: build slowly and from within, with a strong long-term GM/coach pairing that is given plenty of time.
While on the surface that might sound a bit like “staying the course,” there would actually be two significant differences from the approach of the last few years.
The first is tactical: Ian Russell primarily relied on a 4-4-2 diamond system during his highly successful time in Reno and is a true believer in its virtues. On one level, going all in on this system is a bit scary, since it’s long been out of fashion at the MLS level, and is not common in any part of the world. However, its principles are sound, there are plenty of players on-roster who would be excellent fits, and having a slightly unique approach might be precisely what San Jose needs to punch above its weight (not unlike Almeya’s man-marking concepts).
But it would require some significant roster changes to fit. Amahl Pellegrino essentially doesn’t fit anywhere in the formation. Cristian Espinoza, who is rightly already considered a Quakes legend, is unfortunately also an awkward fit, although I could imagine him existing as a second striker, shuttler, or even right back in that setup. Insane though it may sound, in this vision, the best idea might be to sell the 29 year old while he still has significant transfer value and re-invest the DP slot in a true striker. That would coincide with the club opting for the 2 DP/4 U22/$2M GAM model. The four U22 slots would be invested primarily in the central midfield roles, perhaps all four, given that there are a single pivot, two shuttlers, and an attacking midfielder within that grouping. Luis Felipe (now at Sacramento Republic) would be an ideal fit as a backup 6, so I’d give him a call.
The second major change from “stay the course” is focusing on developing players rather than looking for good fits in the transfer market. Despite Luchi’s background as an academy director, no homegrown made his debut under him: Niko Tsakiris made his first appearance under Almeyda and first start under Covelo, and Oscar Verhoeven only just made his debut under Russell. Plus, developmental projects like Ousseni Bouda that had been out of the picture have now been brought back in. In fact, it’s hard to think of any players who got better during Luchi’s tenure, with the possible exception of Jack Skahan.
That may just be an accident of timing in their developmental cycles, but to me it speaks to a genuine upgrade that is possible by switching to Ian Russell and his background as a second-division manager. He’s accustomed to identifying talent that went below the radar and making those players better than they were when he first found them, including by putting them in new positions. That’s one of the few proven ways to win as a low-spending team, aligned with Brighton in the Premier League, Athletic Bilbao in Spain, or the aforementioned Philadelphia Union here in MLS.
To encourage this youth movement, I might be tempted to just jettison every (non-goalkeeper) above the age of 27 on the roster. While in this scenario we’ve already ditched Pellegrino and Espinoza due to poor tactical fit, and Gruezo too since he’s gone in any scenario, that means that even perfectly good players like Alfredo Morales, Vitor Costa, Paul Marie, Carlos Akapo will follow them out the door. That opens up a bunch of roster space, international slots, and money for a re-investment in a new direction. Yueill and Ebobisse could go either way depending on their asking price and Russell’s technical evaluation of them.
All that clearing out not only gives resources to work with, but it opens pathways for young players to actually play: Oscar Verhoeven is buried behind Paul Marie and Carlos Akapo as a right back, for example, so getting rid of at least one of the veterans creates more game time for him to develop. Edwyn Mendoza, similarly, has Morales, Gruezo, Yueill, Tsakiris, and Baldissimo to fight through for one of two pivot spots.
In my opinion, this pathway is almost as attractive as the “hard reset” option, but it has the strong advantage of being highly realistic: you already have the coach and GM in the building. It certainly comes with a bit of risk if you’re investing in a different system, but there’s potential tactical upside there too. I’m also not concerned about the downside of this scenario, since it’s easy to give up on it and move on if in a few years it doesn’t appear to be working (unlike in scenario 2, where you’ll have to wipe the slate clean again if it doesn’t work).
And I haven’t even mentioned what for me is the clincher: if it does work out, it’s a huge win for The Vibes. Russell is a Quakes man in his bones, paid his dues, and has patiently waited for his shot at the MLS level. Leitch is a former Quakes player who has been with the club for years, starting with the Academy and working his way up. A focus on homegrown players always enhances connection between fans and club. Quakes fans (obviously) can handle not winning every game, but they do care deeply about loyalty and understanding the club’s history. There couldn’t be anyone better for that than Ian Russell for that. It’ll feel good, and boy would it be nice to feel good about the Quakes again.
It might not work out. But it’s a worthwhile risk to take, and I’m not convinced any other path is is notably better.
